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Agricultural protection not only lowers total efficiency of resource allocation in 
the world, but also acts as a major obstacle to agricultural trade liberalization. In fact, 
farmers in developed countries are subsidizes while they are often taxed in developing 
countries, as economies grow and agricultural comparative advantage weaker, they 
tend to change from taxing to protecting agriculture, which is the stylized fact of 
international agricultural protection patterns that coexists in many economies. 
The stated objective of politicians on agricultural protection policy is income 
redistribution which would increase farmers’ income and narrow the wealth gap. 
However, by using income quartile and nominal rate of assistance, the empirical study 
finds that an increase in agricultural protection can not raise the poorest group’s 
income relative to the middle and high income groups. There is no enough evidence 
to show that agricultural protection policy could narrow the wealth gap. 
What’s worse, in special interest politics environment, the degree of inequality 
tends to have a negative influence on the agricultural relative rate of assistance. While 
the size of agricultural group is larger, an increase in inequality will raises the 
agricultural relative rate of assistance. Agricultural protection does not help to modify 
inequality, although the government who focus on general interest will raise 
agricultural protection when inequality increases in the hope of improving the income 
of massive poor farmers. If in special interest politics, an increase in inequality will 
lowers the agricultural relative rate of assistance. The decline in agricultural relative 
rate of assistance may come from the increase in non-agricultural relative rate of 
assistance. Because growing inequality leads to a growing imbalance of political 
power, and then the special interest groups can obtain the policy support by 
rent-seeking behavior, which will exacerbate inequality. There is a vicious nexus 
between politics and economics. 
If agricultural protection policy is inefficient and its price is also very expensive, 















theoretically analyzes the persistence of agricultural protection in developed countries 
and the growth of agricultural protection in developing countries by political economy. 
And on this basis, the paper summarizes the major factors that affect the formation of 
international agricultural protection patterns, including the level of economic 
development, agricultural comparative advantage, the size of agriculture group, the 
preferences of policy makers and policy inertia. The paper tests the factors empirically 
and dynamically. The research finds: 
（1） In developed countries, government behavior is important. Political 
institution that depends on the preferences of policy makers plays an important role in 
the formation of agricultural protection. Left-wing government tends to provide 
agricultural protection because they always focus on welfare of labors. And because 
reforms are usually politically sensitive with strong vested interests and, hence, are 
often difficult to achieve, developed countries’ policy makers have a bias for the 
status quo. In addition, it’s not entirely true that agricultural protection will raises with 
economic growth. When economic develops to a high degree, increase in per capita 
income is no longer the reason to maintain the protection, there may be other 
incentives in the formation of policys. The test results of other factors show that the 
decrease of agricultural comparative advantage and the shrink of agriculture group 
will promote governments to provide agricultural protection. 
（2）In developing countries, political institution that depends on the preferences 
of policy makers may not be important for the formation of agricultural protection 
policy. As a result of the uncertainties existence, developing countries’ policy makers 
also have a bias for the status quo. In addition, agricultural protection will raises with 
economic growth. And the governments which begin to focus on social general 
interest tend to provide protection as agriculture groups become larger. However, the 
relationship between agricultural protection and agricultural comparative advantage is 
ambiguous. 
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系导致世界贸易组织（World Trade Organization，WTO）多哈回合（Doha Round）
农业谈判进展缓慢，屡次搁浅，农业在贸易自由化道路上困难重重。直至 2013
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